To understand how easy it is to steal passwords stored in a browser, we recommend watching a demo video that clearly shows how to quickly extract passwords from Chrome, Firefox, and Edge<\/a> using nothing more than a Python script.<\/p>\n Demonstration of how to extract passwords stored in Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Microsoft Edge. (Source)<\/a><\/p><\/div>\n It\u2019s not just specially trained malware that can get up to this sort of mischief, but anyone with physical access to your computer. And no sophisticated hacking skills are required \u2013 scripts for exfiltrating browser-stored passwords are readily available online. All that is required is to run them.<\/p>\n Even an overly curious relative or work colleague could do this if you leave your computer unlocked. Or a hacker visiting your office on a scouting mission. Basically, anyone. The important point is that all your passwords stored in the browser will end up in potentially hostile hands.<\/p>\n And even if the intruder doesn\u2019t have the right script to extract passwords from the browser-saved file, they can scour the settings for the list of sites for which passwords are stored, and then log in to one of them to read your correspondence, for example, or find out other secrets about you.<\/p>\n The world\u2019s most popular browser (Google Chrome, in case you didn\u2019t know) doesn\u2019t even have a basic mechanism to prevent such actions. And while the Firefox developers were good enough to let users protect saved passwords with a primary password, they left this option disabled by default. The primary password must be explicitly enabled and configured, and it is unlikely that many Firefox users even know about it.<\/p>\n The following problem is common to all browsers that allow users, for their convenience<\/em>, to create an account to synchronize browsers on different devices. This means that bookmarks, browser sessions, extensions, settings, as well as saved passwords are all synchronized and stored in the cloud. And if a hacker gets inside your browser account, all they have to do is log in on another computer using the same account. Then all your accounts whose passwords are stored in the browser \u2013 from social networks to online banks \u2013 are there for the taking.<\/p>\n Like browsers, Kaspersky Password Manager<\/a> remembers your credentials and lets you auto-populate them when logging in to websites. But unlike browser developers, we don\u2019t compromise on security. In our password manager, the primary password is used by default and cannot be disabled \u2013 all<\/em> your saved passwords are protected at all<\/em> times. So even if someone gains physical access to your computer, they will not be able to simply log in to sites using the credentials stored in the manager. To do that, they would need the primary password, which no one but you knows (unless you stuck it to your screen on a sticky note).<\/p>\n Another advantage of Kaspersky Password Manager<\/a> is, of course, that all passwords are stored only in encrypted form. And, crucially, we don\u2019t keep the decryption key \u201cunder a doormat\u201d. The encryption key is generated on the fly using the AES-256 algorithm on the basis of the primary password, which allows us not to store it at all. Anywhere. Ever. So even if a stealer manages to get onto your computer, it won\u2019t be able to steal anything \u2013 all your passwords are securely encrypted. Incidentally, if you use Kaspersky Password Manager<\/a> as part of Kaspersky Premium<\/a>, we won\u2019t even let the malware in.<\/p>\n One last thing. Naturally, we use the cloud to synchronize passwords between devices \u2013 all your passwords are linked to your My Kaspersky<\/a> account. But even if an intruder were to somehow gain access to this account, your passwords stored in Kaspersky Password Manager<\/a> would still be perfectly safe. That\u2019s because in the cloud they are stored exclusively in encrypted form, and the decryption key is generated on the basis of the primary password, which only you know and without which attackers are toothless.<\/p>\n![\"Extracting](\"https:\/\/media.kasperskydaily.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/37\/2023\/08\/14164513\/why-it-is-not-safe-to-store-passwords-in-browsers-01.jpg\")
<\/a>2. Physical access to the computer<\/h2>\n
3. Browser account hijacking<\/h2>\n
Why a password manager beats a browser<\/h2>\n